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RECENT DECISIONS
Civil Procedure

-

Open-End Judgments in Water Rights

Cases
Once again a writ of mandamus was filed in the famous Texas "Valley
Water Case."' Relators contended that the purported judgment in the
trial court, rendered by Judge Starley and allegedly disposing of claims to
the water rights along the Rio Grande valley, was interlocutory, from
which no appeal could be taken. The judgment contained an open-end
provision stating that the court retained jurisdiction over the case to
"modify, enlarge, or abrogate any portion" of the judgment.! Relators
asked that the judge be compelled to proceed to final judgment. Held,
application denied: The judgment is a final, appealable one so long as the
open-end provision is confined to the "administration, allocation, and distribution of the water" in accordance with the adjudicated rights determined by the court. State v. Starley, 413 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App.
1967).
In Texas a judgment, whether at law or in equity, must have the essential characteristic of finality before an appeal is allowed.' Finality is
achieved when the judgment, viewed as a whole, disposes of all issues and
parties in a case, either by express provision or by necessary implication.4
An interlocutory judgment, on the other hand, leaves for the future a
determination on some material issue in the case. The purpose of this rule
is to protect the courts from vexatious, frivolous, and untimely appeals.
Exceptions to this rule are provided by statute in Texas which specifically
grants an appeal from an interlocutory judgment.! Without this statutory
authority an appeal will lie only from a final judgment.
The requirement of finality in judgments has caused problems in cases
involving adjudication of water rights, as illustrated in the Starley case.
Due to the fluctuating flow of a stream and the complexities of carrying
out a decree deciding the rights and priorities of litigants, there is a need
for continued supervision over the controversy. A number of states have
handled this problem of management in water rights cases through constitutional amendments and statutes. Varying degrees of authority have
This class action was originally filed in 1956 to determine the rights to the water in the Rio
Grande River from the Falcon Reservoir to the Gulf of Mexico. Several mandamus suits have been
filed seeking to compel the several judges involved in this case to proceed to trial or perform other
acts as in this case. For a discussion of the importance and expenses of this case, see Wilson, The
Proposed State Bar Water Rights Adjudication Statute, 29 TEXAs B.J. 1015 (1966).
'The one paragraph in particular which relators contended made the judgment interlocutory in
nature contained the following:
This court retains jurisdiction of this cause and the issues embraced herein and upon
good cause shown, may from time to time modify, enlarge or abrogate any portion or
feature of this decree or of the decisions and tables and sections filed herewith and
made a part hereof, by order or supplemental judgment or decree to be entered at
the foot hereof.
State v. Starley, 413 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
33 TEx. JUR. 2d Appeal and Error § 76 (1959).
4 Id. § 77.
'TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2008 (1925) (appeal from an interlocutory judgment sustaining or over-ruling a plea of privilege) and TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 2250, 2251 (1925)
(interlocutory appeals in receivership cases).
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been given to either an administrative agency, a court, or both, to retain

jurisdiction in such cases.6
In rendering judgment Judge Starley contended that the problem could
be cured by a judicial exception to the general rule of finality in the form
of an open-end judgment since this type of judgment was not unusual
and commonly used in stream adjudications. To support this proposition

respondents pointed to language in a landmark California case establishing the trial court's power to retain jurisdiction not only over adjudicated
rights, but also undecreed rights, by judicial adoption of the open-end
judgment." However, as the civil appeals court in Starley noted, in Cali-

fornia the declared policy that water be put to its fullest beneficial use
was embodied in a self-enacting constitutional amendment,' and thus

could be implemented by the courts. In Texas, the constitutional Conservation Amendment is not self-enacting and specifically requires the

legislature "to pass all such laws as may be appropriate" to control, preserve, and distribute the state's water.9 Since the amendment places the

duty on the legislature to implement the public policy, the judiciary may
not initiate a new procedure without legislative authority.
In 1965 after years of criticism from the Supreme Court of Texas," and

legal writers, for failure to enact remedial legislation,1" the legislature
passed sections 9-15 of article 7589b," which permit the trial court to
retain jurisdiction under certain circumstances in suits to determine water
rights. Article 7589b authorizes retention of jurisdiction by the trial court
to enlarge, abrogate, or modify the judgment when (1) the case is pending appeal, (2) the decree is confined to the "administration, allocation,
and distribution" of the water, and (3) the rights involved have been
adjudicated by the court.'3
Viewed in light of this statute, the language in the judgment by Judge
Starley was clearly "an expression by the court of its authority under
statutory law enacted in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution.""'i Although the civil appeals court had to reject a judicially created
exception which would give the courts considerably more latitude in dealing with problems in water adjudications, the necessarily limited decision
will help to solve some of the problems in this area.
J.L.A.
6 There are three general types of water right adjudicatory procedures provided in these statutes:

(1) the "Colorado system" is a straight court adjudication system, (2) the "Wyoming system"
is an administrative system with an appeal allowed to the courts from the administrative determination, and (3) the "Oregon system" is also an administrative adjudication procedure, but it differs
from the Wyoming system in that the adjudication is not effective until the administrative agency
obtains court approval of its determination. Although Texas water law is many years behind the other

western states, the Oregon system which affords parties an automatic judicial review is preferred
in Texas over the Wyoming system which places the burden and expense of appeal on the appealing
party.
City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949).
' CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
' TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59.
"0 City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 798 (1955).
"See e.g., King, Inadequacies of Existing Texas Procedure for Determination of Water Rights
on Major Stream Systems, U. OF TEXAS, PROCEEDINGS OF WATER LAW CONFERENCE 66-73 (1956).
" TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7589b (1957, as amended 1965).
1Id. at § 9.
"' State v. Starley, 413 S.W.2d 451, 466 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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Constitutional Law - Criminal Law
zure - The Mere Evidence Rule

-

Search and Sei-

Hayden robbed the Diamond Cab Company on March 17, 1962 at approximately eight a.m. The police were notified that an armed robbery had
taken place, and that the suspect had entered 2111 Cocoa Lane. The police
entered the house without arrest or search warrants and began to search
for a man of the description they had received.' During the search, Hayden was found on the second floor feigning sleep. Simultaneously with
Hayden's arrest, an officer in the basement found items of clothing in the
washing machine which fitted the description of the suspect's clothes.
Hayden was convicted in a state trial court where the clothes were introduced in evidence. Hayden did not appeal his conviction, but sought relief
under the Maryland Post Conviction Act,' claiming that the clothes introduced at his trial, regardless of the fact they were seized incident to a valid
search, were mere evidence and excluded by the fourth amendment. The
Maryland trial court denied his application.! Hayden unsuccessfully applied to the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus. The circuit
court of appeals, one judge dissenting, reversed and granted the writ."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, reversed: Items of only evidential value may be seized by a police officer during a search incident to a
legal arrest. Warden, Md. Penitentiaryv. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
The mere evidence doctrine was first definitely established' in the case of
Gouled v. United States.! In Gouled, and later cases, 7 the Supreme Court
interpreted the fourth amendment's protection against invasion of privacy
to exclude all personal property except fruits, instrumentalities, and contraband of a crime from seizure incident to a legal search.8 The class of
excluded property was labeled mere evidence. Thus, this mere evidence
was considered the product of an unreasonable search, and inadmissible to
prove guilt in court. There is no express language in the fourth amendment to support the mere evidence rule. Regardless of the vague constitutional source, some federal courts justified the rule's existence because it
helped to preserve the privacy of the individual by limiting the scope of
'Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). In this case the Supreme Court
broadened the scope of permissible search without a warrant to allow police in "hot pursuit" of a
suspect to enter the suspect's home.
'MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 645 (1967).
' Hayden v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 233 Md. 613, 195 A.2d 692 (1963).
'Hayden v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 363 F.2d 647 (4th Cir. 1966).
'Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), hinted at the mere evidence exclusionary rule.
6225 U.S. 298 (1921).
7
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 234-35 (1960), noted in 15 Sw. L.J. 341 (1961); United
States v. Rebenowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 64 n.6 (1950); Haris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154
(1947), noted in 15 Sw. L.J. 341 (1961), and 20 Sw. L.J. 391, 392 (1966); United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465-66 (1932).
s Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). The origin and legal implications of the terms
"instrumentalities," "fruits" and "contraband" are discussed in Shellow, The Continuing Vitality
of the Gouled Rule: The Search for and Seizure of Evidence, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 172 (1964); Note,
Eavesdropping Orders and the Fourth Amendment, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 355 (1966); Note, Limitations of Seizure of Evidentiary Objects: A Rule in Search of Reason, 20 U. ClI. L. REv. 319
(1953); 54 GEo. L.J. 593 (1966); 45 N.C.L. REV. 512 (1967).
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a legal search.9 The exact definition of what property constituted mere
evidence was never ascertained. Rather, the federal courts tended to interpret the rule arbitrarily because the differentiation between mere evidence
and an instrument of a crime was often imperceptible."
In the Hayden case, the Court, speaking through Justice Brennan, discarded the mere evidence rule on the grounds that the right of the citizen
to privacy was not further invaded by a legal search for purely evidentiary matter than by a search for contraband, fruits, or instruments of a
crime. 1 In either case, the citizen's right to privacy is protected by the
fourth amendment's procedural safeguards demanding that the government official meet the test of "probable cause" and "specificity" before a
judge will issue a search warrant or allow the introduction of evidence
seized incident to a valid arrest in court." The Court, using the rationale
of Scbnerber v. California," concluded that the scope of reasonable seizure incident to a legal search was not violated if there was a connection
between the items to be seized and criminal behavior." The Court refuted
the argument that mere evidentiary property was more private and deserved more protection on the basis that "nothing in the nature of property seized for evidence is more private than an instrumentality; . . .""
Further, the court reasoned the mere evidence limitations on property
seizable incident to a legal search resulted in hair-splitting, arbitrary decisions by the police and the courts and was inconducive to a sound rationale of law enforcement."' Seizure of purely evidentiary items served the
necessary purpose of helping the government to identify criminals in the
same manner as did the introduction of instruments, fruits and contraband, and therefore served the necessary function of preventing crime. 7
The Hayden case indicates the Supreme Court has responded to public
and political criticisms raised after Miranda v. Arizona." The decision to
eliminate the mere evidence doctrine and to widen the scope of legally
seizable evidence connecting a suspect to a crime will hopefully replace the
confession as the major tool of police investigation. Although the Hayden
case dealt with the scope of search incident to arrest, the Supreme Court
has implied that search warrants may now be issued to seize mere evidentiary items. In the Court's attempt to rebalance criminal justice, it may
'United

States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (1930).

'0 For example, in these cases the Court seemed to be swayed by the reasonableness of the search
and not the nature of the property. Compare Marion v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 194 (1927)
with United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932). Compare also United States v. Guido, 251
F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1958) with United States v. Lerner, 100 F. Supp. 765, 768 (N.D. Cal. 1951)
and Morrison v. United States, 104 App. D.C. 352, 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958) and Matthews
v. Conea, 135 F.2d 534, 537 (2d Cir. 1943).
"387 U.S. at 301-02.
12Id. at 302.
'3384 U.S. 757 (1966), discussed in 20 Sw. L.J. 869 (1966).
'4 Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306-07 (1967).
15 Id. at 309.
16
7 Id.
' Id. at 306 n.11.
"Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), discussed in Comment, Custodial Interrogation as
a Tool of Law Enforcement: Miranda v. Arizona and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 21
Sw. L.J. 255 (1967), and 21 Sw. L.J. 697 (1967).
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have sacrificed more of the citizen's rights to privacy than benefited the
prosecution in preventing crime. Mr. Justice Brennan never directly set a
limit on the scope of a "reasonable" search once the fourth amendment's
procedural requirements are met. The interpretation future courts place
on the words "cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a
particular apprehension or conviction,"19 could indicate the criteria of
reasonableness for future searches. The courts can either interpret this
phrase to limit the seizure of mere evidence only to a crime actively under
investigation, or they can interpret the scope of reasonable search broadly,
enabling the police to search all a suspect's personalty and seize mere evidence of a crime committed in the past or contemplated in the future.
P.A.F.

Constitutional Law

-Loyalty

Oaths-

Texas Article

6 2 52-7's Restriction on Freedom of Association
Gilmore, a tuba instructor at Dallas County Junior College, refused to
execute the non-subversive loyalty oath which was required of all instructors at the College and due to this refusal was dismissed from his teaching
position. He thereafter brought an action against the trustees of the College
for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief,' claiming that the trustees' enforcement of Texas' loyalty oath statute, article 6252-7,' Texas
Revised Civil Statutes, deprived him of his first amendment rights of
freedom of speech, belief, conscience and association and that the statute
was unconstitutionally vague. Held: In order to be constitutional, loyalty
oaths must include the element of specific intent. Otherwise they suffer
from "impermissible overbreadth" and result in a denial of the affiant's
freedom of association guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Gilmore v. James, No. CA #3-1777 (N.D. Tex., Aug. 30, 1967).
The United States Supreme Court has required that loyalty oaths be
subject to certain restrictions in order to be held constitutional They
must include the element of scienter or knowledge of the proscribed organization,' they must be clear and capable of objective measurement,5
and they must include the requirement of specific intent on the part of
the affiant to participate in the proscribed organization's illegal activities.'
The specific intent concept is included for the purpose of directing the
oath at active participants as opposed to passive members. The Texas
19387 U.S. 294, 307

(1967)

(emphasis added).

'28 U.S.C.A. § 2281 (1964).
2Tx.

REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-7 (1962).

Note, The Requirement of Specific Intent-A Further Limitation on Loyalty Oaths, 21
Sw. L.J. 684 (1967).
4
Wiernan v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
'Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
6
Elfbrapdt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
'See
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statute in question provides that no state funds may be paid to any person
who has not executed an oath attesting that he is not and never has been
a member of the Communist Party, and that he is not and during the
past five years has not been a member of certain subversive organizations
set out by the statute.' The three-judge district court hearing the case
upheld Gilmore's contention that the statute denied him freedom of association and was unconstitutionally vague and uncertain. The court cited
the recent Supreme Court cases of Elfbrandt v. Russell8 and Keyishian v.
Board of Regents' as authority for the doctrine that unless loyalty oaths
include the specific intent requirement they result in a denial of freedom
of association guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments.
The absence of the specific intent element in the Texas statute was the
controlling reason for the court's decision. Elfbrandt and Keyishian leave
no doubt that states must include in their loyalty oaths this requirement.
Otherwise they are in conflict with present Supreme Court doctrine.
G.E.S.

Deeds

-

The Use of Negative Evidence To Overcome the

Prima Facie Case of Delivery Established by Recordation
Williams sued Jennie Anderson, seeking title and possession of a piece
of property located in Dallas, Texas. Williams based his claim upon a
warranty deed previously executed by Willie Anderson, the defendant's
deceased husband. The deed purportedly conveyed the property to Williams, subject to a reserved life estate in the grantor, and was duly recorded
in the records of Dallas County. After recordation the deed had been returned to Anderson and apparently never delivered to Williams. The
evidence showed that there was no consideration made or tendered by
the plaintiff, nor that the plaintiff had ever mentioned the transfer to
anyone, nor had the plaintiff in any way treated the property as his own.
Anderson made the mortgage payments on the property until his death
and executed a will leaving the property in question to his wife and a
third party. The defendant maintained that there had never been actual
delivery of the deed, and that Anderson lacked the requisite mental capacity both at the time of the purported transfer of the property and the
delivery of the deed. The jury found that Anderson did not lack the
sufficient mental capacity but that there was no delivery of the deed. Held,
affirmed: The prima facie case of delivery which was established by proving the act of filing the deed for record is effectively overcome by negative
evidence tending to show a lack of intent to convey and in such a case
the jury will be given discretion to find that a recorded deed, valid on its
'TEx.
8384

REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-7 (1962).

U.S. 11 (1966).

9385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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face, has no legal effect. Williams v. Anderson, 414 S.W.2d 731 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1967).*
Title to a piece of transferred property will vest upon execution and
delivery of the deed.' But delivery must be accompanied by the requisite
intent of the grantor before the transfer can become operative as a conveyance.2 The intention of the grantor is shown from all the facts and
circumstances preceding, attending and following the execution of the
instrument.2 The question of delivery is a question of both law and fact
and the courts give the jury wide latitude in determining this question."
Before the court may take the issue from the jury the question of intent
must be clear.'
When there is no evidence as to actual delivery of the deed, and where
the deed was properly recorded, a prima facie presumption of delivery
arises. The presumption of delivery may be rebutted by proof that the
recording of the instrument was for some other purpose, or that there was
fraud, accident, or mistake, or that the grantor had no intention of divesting himself of title.' An extension to this third exception, that the grantor
had no intention of divesting himself of title, was established by the Texas
Supreme Court in Thornton v. Raines,' where the court was faced with
a problem similar to the one in Williams v. Anderson.8 The court stated in
Thornton that if any evidence is introduced, such as the making of a will,
purported lack of delivery, or mental incapacity, no matter how negative
in character, tending to show lack of intent to convey, a jury will be given
extensive discretion to find that a recorded deed, valid on its face, was not
actually delivered.
Thus, the court in Williams v. Anderson' followed the law in Texas
holding that the presumption raised by recordation can be rebutted by
showing (1) that the deed was recorded for a different purpose, (2) that
there was fraud, accident or mistake, or (3) that the grantor had no intention of divesting himself of title. Concerning the latter, the jury is
given wide discretion to find lack of requisite intent through evidence
negative in character.
L.J.B.

* [Editor's note: This case is perhaps also significant in that law students in the Legal Clinic of
Southern Methodist University School of Law actively participated in the trial of the case and the
argument of the appeal.]
' Parks v. Willard, I Tex. 350 (1846); Hall v. Edwards, 222 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
'Bussan v. Donald, 244 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref. n.r.e.
'Thornton v. Raines, 157 Tex. 65, 299 S.W.2d 287 (1957); Check Kuhn v. Downs, 208
S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.; Walker v. Erwin, 106 S.W. 164 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1907). Note that Thornton v. Raines was criticized in a Note, 35 TEXAS L. REV. 852 (1957).
4Towey v. Henderson, 60 Tex. 291 (1883); Dorman v. Ryan, 293 S.W. 888 (Tex. Civ.
App.
1927) error ref.; Johnston v. Johnston, 67 S.W. 123 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902).
'McCartney v. McCartney, 93 Tex. 359, 55 S.W. 310 (1900); Wheat v. Wheat, 239 S.W. 667
(Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
"Thornton v. Raines, 157 Tex. 65, 299 S.W.2d 287 (1957); Koppleman v. Koppleman, 94
Tex. 40, 57 S.W. 570 (1900); Ford v. Hachel, 77 S.W.2d 1043 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
7157 Tex. 65, 299 S.W.2d 287 (1957).
'414
S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
9

Id.
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Enforcement

Pursuant to a divorce decree rendered in 1946, Hooks, the relator, was
required to make periodic child support payments. By the spring of 1961
he was $4,070 in arrears and found in contempt of court. After several
months in jail he was released, ordered to pay $60 per month until his

youngest child reached age eighteen, and held in continuing contempt until
the $4,070 arrearage was paid in full. Hooks made the monthly payments
required by the 1961 order but did not reduce the arrearage. When his

youngest child reached age eighteen he discontinued all payments and refused to pay the delinquent amounts due under the 1961 order. His exwife brought suit to enforce payment; he was again found in contempt
and confined in the county jail. Hooks brought this habeas corpus proceeding, claiming that the district court had no power to enforce the 1961
order after his youngest child reached eighteen. Held, dismissed: The dis-

trict court has power to enforce payment of its child support orders after
the beneficiary child reaches age eighteen if the order was made prior to the
time the child reached age eighteen. Ex Parte Hooks, 415 S.W.2d 166
(Tex. 1967).
Article 4639a' provides that the court rendering a divorce may order
either parent to make periodic or lump-sum payments for the support of
their children until such children reach age eighteen, and to enforce these
orders by civil contempt. The supreme court has held that under article
4639a the district courts can confine a delinquent parent until he purges
himself of contempt by paying the amount of accumulated periodic payments. However, it is also settled that the court loses its jurisdiction to
order new child support payments after the children of the divorced
couple reach age eighteen.3 Thus, in the present case the narrow question
was whether the court could enforce, after the child's eighteenth birthday,
an order made before that time.
The supreme court held that the statute created two distinct powers.
First, the court rendering the divorce is authorized to order support payments; this power is limited to the period during which there are children
under eighteen. In addition, the court is empowered to enforce its support
orders by contempt; this second power is not limited to the period during
which there is a child under eighteen. Therefore, the district court had
power to enforce the 1961 judgment ordering Hooks to pay the $4,070
even though no child was under eighteen at the time of enforcement because the order had been made during the pre-eighteen period when the
court had jurisdiction to enter a support order.
The case epitomizes the appalling inadequacy of the existing child support provisions. By settled rule, a contempt proceeding is the only method
of enforcing court ordered child support payments.4 In the instant case
Hooks made the required periodic payments from 1961 until 1963 but
'TEX.
2

REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.

art. 4639a (Supp. 1966).

Ex parte Savelle, 398 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1966).

3Ex

pare Hatch, 410 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1967).
1 See Ex parte Hatch, 410 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1967)

and cases cited therein.
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did nothing to make up the pre-1961 deficiencies. His ex-wife thus had
to choose between accepting the payments or instituting new contempt
proceedings. If she followed the latter course the monthly payments probably would have ceased, either because Hooks, angered by the contempt
action, would have become recalcitrant or because he would have been in
jail and thus unable to earn the money to make the payments. In order to
avoid possible loss of the monthly payments, the ex-wife as a practical
matter had to refrain from trying to recoup the past deficiencies. Had the
supreme court not held that the district court had continuing jurisdiction
to enforce its orders, the ex-wife would have lost her chance to enforce
payment of the arrearages at the only time it was practical for her to assert
it, i.e., after the children reached age eighteen.
C.M.D.

Federal Judiciary -Judicial
of Columbia School Board

Appointment of the District

Under D.C. Code section 31-101 the school board for the District of
Columbia is appointed by the United States District Court of the District
of Columbia. Hobson sought a declaratory judgment and injunction forbidding exercise of authority by Hansen, the superintendent of the schools
and other members of the board, on the grounds that the statute was an
unconstitutional delegation of executive powers and duties in the judiciary.
The case was heard by a three-judge district court in accordance with 28
U.S.C. section 2282.' Both parties moved for summary judgment. Held:
Defendant's motion for summary judgment granted. Congress can empower the District Court of the District of Columbia to appoint the school
board by virtue of article I, section 8, clause 17 of the Constitution in
conjunction with article III,' or by virtue of article II, section 2, clause 2.'
Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967).

Under article I, section 8, clause 17 of the Constitution, Congress has
plenary power to legislate for the District of Columbia. One result of
this power has been that the District Court for the District of Columbia
'D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-101 (1961) in its pertinent part provides: "The members of the Board
of Education shall be appointed by the United States District Court judges of the District of Columbia."
2 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1964) provides: "An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the
enforcement, operation, or execution of any Act of Congress for repugnance to the Constitution
shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof unless the application therefor is heard
and determined by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title." See also Hobson
v. Hansen, 252 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1967).
aU.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 states: "[Congress shall have Power] ....
To exercise exclusive legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District . . . as may . . . become the seat of
the Government of the United States." U.S. CoNST. art. III, § I provides: "The judicial Power of
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish ....
"
4 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 speaks of the presidential power of appointment and then adds:
"[Blut the Congress may by law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."
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has been given powers and assigned duties which could not be received
by other federal courts.'
Prior to 1933 the courts of the District were generally assumed to be
legislative courts. Obiter in Ex parte Bakelite' expressly called the courts
of the District legislative courts. This idea was rejected by the Supreme
Court in O'Donogbue v. United States,' where it was held that the courts
of the District were constituted by virtue of article III and therefore the
judges were entitled to the protection of that article. The Supreme Court
then added that because of Congress' plenary power to legislate for the
District, federal courts in the District could be given powers which could
not be given to other article III courts. The Supreme Court recognized
that the courts in the District had a type of dual status.
To this point, the decision of the court in the instant case seems to be
sufficiently grounded on precedent.8 However, the court suggests an alternative basis to support its decision: the power of federal courts to appoint
inferior officers. In support of this proposition the court cites, in part,
article II, section 2, clause 2.'
The court cites In the Matter of Hennent ' which held that a clerk in a
federal court was an inferior officer which the Constitution would have
the courts of law appoint. In Hennen it was emphasized that the appointing power of article II, section 2, clause 2 was undoubtedly intended to be
exercised by the department of government to which the officer to be appointed most appropriately belonged." The court in the instant case stated
that Ex parte Siebold1" explicitly refuted the proposition that Hennen
meant that it could only appoint officers related to the judicial function.
The Court in Siebold devised this test: the appointive power assigned to
courts must not be so incongruous in the duty required so as to excuse the
court from its performance or to render its acts void."3
The test established in Siebold is not easily understood nor easily applied, but it is relied upon by the majority in the instant case. As Judge
Skelly Wright said in his dissent, it would seem that on its face the appointment of the members of a school board is a function incongruous with
the functioning of the judiciary. Judge Wright also felt that the courts in
the District should no longer be viewed as "hybrid," because this meant
' The District Court of the District of Columbia has been vested with revisionary powers over
patent appeals, Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50 (1884); over rates fixed by public utilities, Kellar
v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); and over orders of the Federal Radio Commission,
Radio Comm'n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930).
279 U.S. 438 (1924).
289 U.S. 596 (1933).
sId.
9See note 4 supra.
'038 U.S. (13 Pet.)230 (1839).
"Id. at 257-58.
12100

U.S. 371

(1880).

'31d. at 398. Judge Skelly Wright in his dissent in the instant case suggests that the appointments in the Siebold case could be classified as "court-related" personnel. In his opinion the appointment of members of the school board was a function incongruous with the judicial function because
it embroils the judiciary in public affairs and thereby adversely affects both the independence and
prestige of the court. Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 921-25 (D.D.C. 1967) (dissent).
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that the citizens of the District were disadvantaged by having a court
which was active in an area he felt was purely political.' 4
The decision of the court seems to be founded on sufficient precedent
to sustain their holding that the District Court in the District of Columbia can be assigned this power, even if the propriety of doing so is questionable. The use of article II, section 2, clause 2 to support its decision in
the alternative leaves much to be desired, for this section applies to every

federal court in the United States. It has long been established that all
other federal courts cannot be assigned non-judicial duties.'" It is doubtful
that this interpretation of article II, section 2, clause 2 is correct.
C.R.R.

Negotiable Instruments -The

Requirement of Reasonable Promptness, in Holding a Drawee Bank Liable for Late
Revocation of a Check

Payee, Pure Ice & Cold Storage Co., participated in a check exchange
practice with John Calvin, the payor, mainly because of payor's poor
credit standing. Drawee, Exchange Bank & Trust Co. of Dallas, received
the check in question on Tuesday, September 25, 1962, but did not return
the check dishonored until Thursday, September 27, 1962, which was beyond the statutory deadline prescribed in article 342-704 of the Texas
Banking Code.' Payee attempted collection by sending the check back
through and upon failure to collect, obtained a promissory note from
payor for the sum owed. After a period of just under two years and slightly before the statute of limitation had run, payee instituted suit against
drawee Exchange Bank & Trust Co. of Dallas. Held, reversed: When a
drawee bank fails to revoke a check within the statutory period,' it is necessary to exercise the election to hold the bank liable with reasonable
promptness. Pure Ice & Cold Storage v. Exchange Bank dq Trust Co., 415
S.W.2d 897 (Tex. 1967).
The American Banker's Association recognized the problems involved
14265 F. Supp. at 921-25.

"5Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S.

'The

346 (1911).

provisions of the statute, material here, are as follows:
1. . . . [I]tems presented to a drawee bank shall be received by it, . . . shall be conditional and subject to revocation during the day of presentment or until midnight of
the banking day after the day of presentment, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, if
it is finally determined that the drawee bank was not at the time of presentment
. . . obligated to pay the item, and if the drawee bank shall within that time refuse
payment and return the item ..
2. If the item is presented through a clearing house, the drawee bank shall, within the
time prescribed, return the item to the clearing house presenting it.
3. . . . If the drawee bank in refusing payment of any item fails to comply with the
provisions of this Article within the time above prescribed it shall at the election of
the owner of the item, be deemed to have adopted the item and shall be liable for the
amount thereof.
TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-704 (1964) (emphasis added).
aSupra note 1.
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in deferred posting and proposed a model statute for all states in the Model
Bank Collection Code.' To effectuate the smooth and speedy transaction of
business and give as much permanency to the procedure as possible, the
Texas Banking Code adopted a deferred posting statute. Under the statute,
payment of the check by the drawee bank does not become final until
midnight of the day following the day of presentment. And if the bank is
delinquent in revocation, " the drawee bank ... shall at the election of the
owner .. .be liable for the amount thereof."4
The lower courts directed much attention to the word "election" in the
statute, treating it as if it meant election of remedies. Election of remedies
is the prosecution of one of two inconsistent remedies until final judgment.
The true meaning of the word "election" in context with this statute is
merely an option whether or not to hold the bank liable. The supreme
court properly held this "election" not to be an election of remedies.
The court required that in conjunction with the purpose of the statute,
the election to hold the drawee bank liable should be done with reasonable
promptness. The purpose of the statute was (1) to expedite the check collection procedure and (2) to establish some finality of provisional credits.
To not require such a standard could leave the provisional credits unsettled until the limitations had run. The court did not set a definite
"reasonable time" but did indicate that the statute of limitations was not
to govern and that slightly less than two years was beyond the scope of
reasonable time.
Although the Uniform Commercial Code has superseded the Texas
Banking Code, it still includes the same requirement of reasonable time.
Since this section of the Uniform Commercial Code' has been adopted in
all of the jurisdictions adopting the Uniform Commercial Code, this
problem of "what is reasonable time" will be inherent whenever the statute is applicable. The legislatures have required the banks to act within a
very limited time period and it seems only logical that the courts will act
in accordance and require similar expeditious action on the part of the
payee.
J.F.

Taxation - Texas Gas Gross Production -

Exemption of

Fuel, Used in Gas Lift Operations
Plaintiffs, operators of Texas oil and gas leases, used casinghead gas as a
power source to operate either mechanical or hydraulic (Kobe method)
equipment used to lift oil from beneath the surface of the land. They did
not sell any of the casinghead, nor was such gas used for any other purpose. The Texas Comptroller assessed gas gross production taxes' on the
a2
T. PATTON, DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS 1373 (4th ed. 1942).
4
Supra note 1.
' UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-401.

'Tx.

TAx.-GEN. ANN. arts. 3.01-.10

(1964).
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casinghead so produced and used, which assessment was paid under protest
and the instant suit was brought to recover the same on the ground that
casinghead gas used by the producer as fuel to lift oil is exempt from the
Texas Gas Gross Production tax.' The trial court held for plaintiffs, and
defendant appealed to the Austin Court of Civil Appeals. Held, affirmed:
Casinghead gas used to operate equipment to lift oil from beneath the surface of the land is exempt from the Texas Gas Gross Production tax under
the exclusion from the tax base of "gas used for lifting oil, unless sold for
such purposes."' Said exemption is not limited to gas injected into the
ground4 but also applies to gas consumed in furnishing power to operate a
motor which, in turn, operates equipment to lift oil from the earth, either
hydraulically or mechanically. Calvert v. Kadane, 418 S.W.2d 315 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1967), error granted.
Kadane turned on a question of statutory interpretation based on the
legislative history of what is now article 3.01 of the Texas Gas Gross Production Tax Act.5 Article 3.01's predecessor as originally enacted provided,
inter alia, that "the value of residue gas lawfully injected into the earth
...for lifting oil . . ."' was excluded from the tax base in the computation of tax liability. The statute was amended in 1945 to provide that the
value "of gas injected into the earth ... and gas used for lifting oil, unless
sold for such purpose" 7 should be excluded from the tax base. Subsequent
amendments did not substantially affect the statute' which was codified in
1959 as article 3.01." However, an attorney general's opinion issued December 30, 1947 construed the phrase "used for lifting oil" in the predecessor of article 3.01 (2) (c) "to apply to gas injected into the earth for
repressuring or lifting the oil out of the ground, and as having no reference to its use as fuel to generate mechanical power, such as pumping operations for lifting oil."'" This opinion followed a prior opinion" but the
latter had been issued prior to the 1945 statutory amendment." The court
found that the 1947 ruling was clearly wrong 3 and held that gas may be
2Id.

art. 3.01 (2) (c)

(1964).

3 Id.

'This limitation had been administratively imposed by TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. V-467
(1947). See also TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. Nos. 0-4151-A, 0-3516 (1941) construing TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7047(b) (1941).
5
TEx. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 3.01 (1964).
'TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 7047(b) (1941) (emphasis added).
7Tex. Laws 1945, ch. 269, § 1, at 423, amending TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7047(b)

(1941).

'Tex. Laws, 1st Spec. Sess. 1954, ch. 2, art. 1, § 1, at 3; Tex. Laws 1951, ch. 402, § 3, at 695.
9
TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 3.01 (1959).
" TEX. ATT'Y GEN. OP. No. V-467 (1947).
"See note 4 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 4, 10 supra. The Comptroller's Office applied TEx. ATT'Y GEN.
Op. No. V-467 (1947) until 1967, seemingly without protest from taxpayers. However, in the
trial court, Mr. W. B. Davis, Director of Oil and Gas Taxation in the Comptroller's Office, testified
that no tax was levied on gas consumed by a motor "prime mover," used to compress injection
gas that aerated or lifted a column of oil from the earth. Calvert v. Kadane, 418 S.W.2d 315,
318 n.3 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
32 The court reasoned that when the legislature enacts an amendment to a presently existing
statute, it is presumed to have intended some change or alteration of existing law. Calvert v. Kadane, 418 S.W.2d 315, 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). See American Sur. Co. v. Axtell Co.,
120 Tex. 166, 36 S.W.2d 715 (1931).
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used to lift oil without being injected into the earth; the word "used" being synonymous with "employed" or "consumed."" Thus, the court concluded that gas used as a power supply for a motor used to operate equipment to lift oil from the earth, unless purchased for such purpose, is
exempt from taxation under article 3.01.
The court thus overruled twenty years of administrative tax policy.
However, the decision seems sound. The resultant boon to taxpayers is far
from inconsequential. The only remaining uncertainty is whether
Texas supreme court will allow the benefit to accrue to the taxpayer
or whether any revision of the law will be left to the legislature.

S.C.S.

Torts -

Availability of Consortium as a Joint Action by
Husband and Wife

Plaintiff's husband, permanently disabled, filed a personal injury suit
against defendent, but later settled out of court. Plaintiff filed a subsequent action in which she alleged that as a result of defendent's negligence
she suffered a loss of the normal society, companionship, and consortium'
of her husband to which she was entitled. In her petition plaintiff contended that the Maryland common law doctrine of consortium, giving the
right of action to the husband but not the wife, violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by discrimination against the
female sex. The lower court sustained defendent's demurrer and plaintiff
appealed to the court of appeals. Held, affirmed: The right to sue a third
party for loss of consortium is available only as a joint action by both the
husband and wife, and therefore the wife may not maintain a separate
action after her husband has settled with the third party. Deems v. Western
Maryland Railway, 231 A.2d 514 (Md. App. 1967).
At common law a wife was denied the right to sue a third party for
loss of consortium' on the theory that "the legal existence of the wife is
suspended or incorporated into that of the husband."' This common law
doctrine was universally accepted until the 1950 decision of Hitaffer v.
Argonne Co., in which the circuit court broke from the common law
because of the equal status of the wife in modern legal theory. Since the
Hitaffer case, some states have upheld the common law doctrine because
'"See Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Co., 378 S.W.2d
Reynolds v. McMann Oil Co., 11 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928).

50

(Tex.

1964);

, Consortium has been generally defined as "the conjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and
the right of each to the company, companionship, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation."
McMillan v. Smith, 47 Ga. App. 646, 171 S.E. 169 (1933).
2
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950);
La Eace v. Cincinnati, N. & P. Ry., 249 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1952); Nelson v. A.M. Lockett & Co.,
206 Okla. 334, 243 P.2d 719 (1952).
'Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 231 A.2d 514, 521 (Md.App. 1967).
4 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cer. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
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of its historical significance,' while others have over-turned the doctrine because of its irrationality' or its violation of the equal protection clause."
The majority of the Maryland court took a somewhat different approach
in overturning the common law doctrine. They felt that both spouses
were injured by the loss of consortium as a result of the negligence of the
third party. Therefore the right of action for such injury should be held
jointly by both the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety. This
means that neither spouse can dispose of the right without the assent of the
other. This action must be a part of the personal injury action of the injured spouse, and a settlement by the injured spouse, as occurred in the
instant case, acts to extinguish the joint action for loss of consortium.
Classification of the action for loss of consortium as a joint right of both
parties seems preferable to the other solutions so far offered! The problem
of double recovery is eliminated and both spouses receive equal protection
under the law.'
T.W.W.

'Miller v. Sparks, 189 N.E.2d 720 (Ind. App. 1963); Potter v. Schafter, 161 Me. 340, 211
A.2d 891 (1965); Wiseman v. Knaus, 24 App. Div. 2d 869, 264 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1965); Garrett v.
Reno Oil Co., 271 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e. (legislature to make any
change in the common law doctrine).
'Manning v. Jones, 349 F.2d 992 (8th Cir. 1965); Slovin v. Gauger, 193 A.2d 452 (Del.
Super. 1963).
T
Carey v. Foster, 345 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1965) (court extinguished the right of action in the
husband rather than created a separate right in the wife); Owen v. Illinois Baking Corp., 260 F.
Supp. 820 (W.D. Mich. 1966); Clem v. Brown, 207 N.E.2d 398 (Ohio C.P. 1965). But see Krohn
v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 406 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1966), cert. denied, 87 S. Ct. 1160 (1967);
Seagraves v. Legg, 147 W. Va. 331, 127 S.E.2d 605 (1962).
'See authorities cited in footnotes 5-7 supra.
' Igneri v. Cie de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1963); Ekalo v. Constructive
Serv. Corp. of America, 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965).

